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[Crim. No. 4298.

In Bank.

Feb. 13, 1942.]

In re RUFUS BELL et al., on Habeas Corpus.
[la, Ib] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Unconstitutional
Statute or Ordinance.-Haheas corpus is an appropriate remedy by which one can procure a determination of the constitutionality -of the statute or ordinance under which he has
been convicted. It is the only remedy available for such purpose where the remedy by appeal has been exhausted. While
the trial courts have jurisdiction to determine the constihitionality of the law in question, the writ lies, apart from any
remedy by appeal, because of the importance of securing a
correct determination of such question.
[2] Id.-Existence of Other ReID.edy-Discretion.-The requirement of the exhaustion of all available remedies by appeal
before invoking habeas corpus to test constitutionality is not
mandatory; but since the granting of the writ results in the
release of the petitioner whereas an appeal may result merely
in a new trial with the exclusion of charges based on unconstitutional .provisions or the inclusion of procedure constitutionally guaranteed, the courts may in their discretion refuse
to grant the writ prior to the exhaustion of the remedy by
appeal.
[3] Oriminal Law-Prohibition by Law-Sufficiency and Validity
of Enactments.-A statute or 'ordinance prohibiting both conduct that may be prohibited and conduct that may not is too
uncertain and vague to be enforced, and a cOllviction thereunder cannot stand even though the acts done could be validly
prohibited by properly drafted legislation. It is not the function of the court to determine whether the restrictions imposed
by the legislation can be validly applied to the facts of a particular case.
[4] Labor - Offenses - Picketing Ordinance-Validity.-A provision of an ordinance making it a crime for "any person to
[1] Habeas corpus to test the constitutionality of an ordinance,
note, 32 A. L. R. 1054.. See, also, 13 Oal. Jur. 217, 225, 230, 232;
25 Am. Jur. 151, 164,170,174.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 8] Habeas Corpus, § 15; [2] Habeas
Corpus, § 7; [3J Criminal Law, § 9; [4, 7J Labor, § 31; [5, 12]
Labor, § 23; [6J Constitutional Law, § 64; [9] Habeas Corpus,
§ 61; [10, 11] Habeas Corpus, § 62.
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loiter, stand, or sit upon any public highway, alley . . . so as
to in any manner hinder or obstruct the free passage . . . of
persons or vehicles," is unconstitutional since it embraces
peaceful picketing and other acts that may not be prohibited.
[5] Id.-Picketing-Peaceful Picketing.-The character of picketing iIi the course of a labor dispute as being peaceful or otherwise is determitled not by the existence of a threat but by
what is actually threatened. Peaceful picketing involves besetting the premises of another for the purpose of inducing
employees to quit their employment or dissuading ot hers from
seeking employment. The fact that to some exton t compulsion, coercion, intimidation, or threats are employed does not
detract from its peaceful nature so long as they constitute
only -economic, moral, or social pressure.
(6] Oonstitutional Law - Oonstitutionality of Statutes _ Partial
UnconstitutionalitY-Separable Provisions.-When part of a
statute is declared unconstitutional, the remainder will stand
if it is complete in itself and would have been adopted by the
legislature had it foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute. An ordinance prohibiting both peaceful picketing and
picketing by acts of violence will be upheld so far as acts of
violence are concerned where the valid part of the ordinance
is complete in itself, and the ordinance contains a severance
clause.
(7] Labor-Offenses-Picketing Ordinance-Acts of Violence.While an ordinance is invalid if it makes illegal the same acts
that are made illegal by the general laws of the state, an'ordinance prohibiting picketing by acts of violence defines an
offense different from general acts of violence unconnected
with a labor controversy, and does not conflict with the laws
relating to assault, battery, riot, disturbing the peace, and unlawful assemblage.
'
[8] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief---Unconstitutional Statute
or Ordinance-Partial InvaliditY.-Whereone petitioning for
a writ of habeas corpus was convicted of violating an ordinance in part invalid, pursuant toa complaint charging a
public offense, and where the punishment imposed upon him
is not excessive for violation of the valid portion of the ordinance, he can be releal:led only if it is clear that he was not
convicted of violating that provision.
[9a, 9b] Id.-Hearing-Presumptions_Regularity of Judgment[6] See 5 Oal. Jur. 644; 11 Am. Jur. 834.
[8] See 13 Oal. Jur. 235; 25 Am. Jur. 247.
[9] "And/or," note, 118 A. L. R. 1367. See, also, 15 Oal. Jur.
64, 503; 6 Oal. Jur. Ten-year'Supp. 611 ;25 Am~ Jur. 247.
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Where Law in Part Invalid.-On habeas corpus, which is in
the nature ofa collateral attack, the judgment attacked car·
ries with it a presumption of regularity, but in the case
of a justice's court judgment, the presumption applies only
where the ;judgment affirmatively shows that the court has
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter. The presumption is not conclusive. And where a complaint charged
both in the conjunctive and disjunctive a violation of every
provision of an ordinance in part invalid, and the verdict was
guilty as charged, and it is impossible to determine from the
record whether there was a conviction of a violation of the
valid provisions of the law, the presumption of regularity
casts upon the party seeking release on habeas corpus the
burden of proving that the conviction was based upon the'
unconstitutional provisions.
[10] Id. - Hearing - Evidence. - A petitioner seeking a writ of
habeas corpus. is not confir.ed to the record when attempting
to sustain the burden of proving that his conviction was in
violation of his constitutional rights. Such proceeding permits an examination of the evidence introduced at the trial
and adrlitior,al evidence bearing on the infringement of constitutional rights,-not to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, but to decide whether the verdict
violates constitutional guaranties. (See Pen. Code, § 1484.)
[11] Id.-Hearing-Evidence-Sufficiency-Nonconviction of Acts
of Violence.-Ina habeas corpus proceeding to secure the release of petitioners convicted of violating an ordinance prohibiting both peaceful picketing· and picketing by acts of violence, the burden of proving that they were not tried and convicted for acts of violence is not sustained where the evidence
reveals that large groups of pickets forcefully stopped automobiles entering picketed premises and intimidated the occupants.
(12] Labor - Picketing-Acts of Violence-What Constitutes.While pickets in a labor dispute may bring themselves to notice of persons entering the picketed premises, they may not
forcibly stop autom<..11!1es and intimidate the occnpants by
gathering in large numbers. Such action is forceful intimidation.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. VV rit discharged.
Andersen & Resner, George R. Andersen and Herbert Resner for Petitioners.
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Joseph L. Heenan, District Attorney (Yliba), and Erling
S. Norby for Respondent.
. TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioners, members of a labor union,
while engaged in picketing certain ranches and orchards,
were arrested and charged with violating sections 2 and 3 of
an anti-picketing ordinance adopted by the Board of Supervis0rs of Yuba County in 1937. These sections read as follows: "Section 2. It is unlawful for any person to loiter,
stand, or sit upon any public highway, alley, sidewalk or
crosswalk so as to in any manner hinder or obstruct the free
passage therein or thereon of persons or vehicles passing or
attempting to pass along the same, or so as to in any manner
annoy or molest persons passing along the same."
"Section 3. It is unlawful for any persons to beset or
picket the premises of another, or any approach thereto, where
any person is elliployed or seeks employment, or any place or
approach thereto where such employee or person seeking emphymcnt lodges or resides, for the purpose of inducing such
empIr-yee or person seekIng employment, by means of compulsion, coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of violence, or
fear to quit his or hor empl0yment or to refrain from seeking
or freely entoring intll employment."
The complaint did not specify the acts of misconduct on
the part of petitioners but followed the language of the ordinance. It charged .petitioners in count 1 with violating any
one "andlor" any other provision of section 2, and in count
2, with violating anyone "andlor" any other provision of
section 3. They were tried in the Justice's Court of Marysville Township, County of. Yuba, found guilty "as charged
in the complaint," and sentenced "on said conviction" to a
fine of $500 or 6 months in jail. On appeal the superior court,
the court of last resort in cases arising in a municipal or justice's court (Cal. Const., art. VI, sec. 5) unheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and affirmed the conviction, but
reduced the jail sentence to 3 months. Petitioners thereafter applied to the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that the ordinance was unconstitutional. When
that court denied the writ, petitioners renewed their application in the District Court of Appeal, but the latter court
also denied the writ and upheld the ordinance as constitutional. Petitioners now ask this court for a writ of habeas
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corpus, contending that the ordinance prohibits peaceful
picketing and therefore abridges freedom of speech, press and
assemblage in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
and article I, sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of California.
[ia] A preliminary question is whether the constitutionality
of an ordinance may be tested by application for a writ of habeas corpus. Most jurisdictions permit such a use of habeas corpus. (See cases collected in 25 Am. Jur. 164, sec 29; 13 Cal.
J ur. 225, sec. 8; 39 L. R. A. 450; 32 A. L. R .. 1054.) They
adhere to the theory, however, that habeas corpus can lie,. not
to substitute for a writ of error, but only to test the jurisdiction of the trial court or to secure the release of person~
detained without judicial authorization or under a void pro
ceeding. (See 25 Am. Jur. 151, sec. 13; 13 Cal. Jur. 217
sec. 4; Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176 [9 S. Ct. 672\
33 L. Ed. 118] ; I-Iarlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442 [31 S.
Ct. 44, 54 L. Ed. 1101]; Ex parte Moran, 144 Fed. 594 [75
C. C. A. 396]; 1 Bailey, Habeas Corpus [1913], sec. 2, 30
et seq.; 12 N. Y: L. Q. R. 525.) The theory and the practice
are somewhat inconsistent. In order to reconcile them the
courts have resorted to the artificial reasoning of Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 [25 L. Ed. 717], that an unconstitutional statute is actually not a statute, and that a trial court
therefore has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of proceedings based upon such a statute. The unconstitutionality
of a statute, however, is not a foregone conclusion but the
very question at issue and it has traditionally been one that
trial courts have jurisdiction to decide.. (See 39 L. R. A. 454.)
State courts constantly make decisions regarding the validity
of statutes under the Constitution of the United States, and
the United States Supreme Court, which reviews their determinations by writ of error, has expressly stated that they have
jurisdiction in such cases. (See Robb v. Co-nnolly, 111 U. S.
624 [4 S. Ct. 544, 28 L. Ed. 542].) If they lacked it the
United States Supreme Court would be compelled to reverse
the decision of a state court because of lack of jurisdiction
without further inquiry into the merits of the case. (See
JJ1ansfield O. & L. JJ1. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 [4 S. Ct.
510, 28 L. Ed. 462].) It has never been held that a decision
holding a statute invalid is void because the statute itself
j
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was void. ' 'Therefore, unless we adopt the peculiar theory
that the court has jurisdiction to decide right, but not to
decide wrong, we are driven to the conclusion that a decision
is not void for lack of jurisdiction merely because it decides
that an unconstitutional statute is valid." (39 L. R. A.
454; see McGovney, Cases on Constitutiona1 Law [1st ed.],
pp. 198-200.)
A minority of courts, realizing the inconsistency between
the practice of using habeas corpus to test constitutionality
and the theory that it lies only to test jurisdiction, will not
permit the question of constitutionality to be raised by
habeas corpus. (See cases cited in 25 Am. Jur.; 39 L. R. A.;
32 A. L. R., all supra.) There is, however, a less drastic solution. The courts can permit an independent review by habeas
corpus of matters over which the trial court had jurisdiction,
apart from any remedy by appeal, because it is warranted by
the importance of securing a correct determination on the
question of constitutionality. "It must never be forgotten
that thew-rit of habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of
personal liberty and there is no higher duty than to maintain
it unimpaired .... the r:ule is not so inflexible that it may not
yield to exceptional circumstances where the need for the
remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent."
(Chief Justice Hughes in Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19,
26, 27 [59 S. Ct. 442, 83 L. Ed. 455].) There are instances
where habeas corpus affords the only method of testing constitutionality as when a statute upheld as valid at the time of
conviction is subsequently declared invalid in another case
and in the interim the petj doner either exhausts his remedy
by ap:t1 eal or the time for taking an appeal expires. (Ex parte
Lockhart, 25 Okla. Cr. 4~9 [221 Pac. 119]; In re Jarvis, 66
Kan. 329 [71 Pac. 576].) In California only a writ of
habeas corpus enables a higl]er court to decide the question of
constitutionality in cases which, like the present one, arise in
a justice's or municipal court and can be appealed only to
the superior court. (See Ex parte Siebold, supra, involving a
similar situation.)
Habeas corpus is also widely used to test the constitutionality not only of a statute but of the procedure in petitioner's trial, even though the trial court has jurisdiction to try
the petitioner (see Ex parte N'ielsen, supra; 35 Columbo L.
Rev. 404 at 412), and any infringement of constitutional right
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during the trial may be raised on appeal. The federal CNuts
have repeatedly held that habeas corpus lies if the accused
has been deprived of such fundamental constitutional gilUrantees as the right to counsel (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458
[58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461]; see Powell v. Alabama:
287 U. S. 45 [53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527] ),
the right to a fair trial free frum mob violence (Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 [43 S. Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543]) or
free from the use of testimony known to the prosecution to
be perjured (Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 105 [55 S.
Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A. IJ. R. 406].) (See, also, Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 [47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749], insuring
the right to an impartial judge.) The federal Cou.rts regard
these rights as SJ fundamentl.ll as to admit all additional special procedure to insure their protection once the remedy in
the state courts lS exhausteu (Mooney v. Holohan, supra),
or is no longer available (Jvhnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458
[58 S. Ct. 1019,82 L. Ed. 1461].)
There are other situati(.'lls in which habe.as corpus is used,
not as a test of jurisdiction, but to review a question of
law that cannot otherwise be raised or is so important as to
render the ordinary procedure inadequate. Thus, it lies to
test whether there is probable cause to justify thf> committing magistrate inholding petitioner for trial. (Pen. Code
sec. 1487; Ex parte Willimns, 52 Cal. App. 566 [199 Pac.
347] ; Application of Hartwell, 28 Cal. App. 627 [153 Pac.
730] ; see, also, cases cited in 13 Cal. Jur. 230, sec. 12; 25 Am.
Jur. 170, sec. 37.) There is no other method of securing a
review of th~ magistrate's determination in this regard.
(People v. Creeks, 170 Cal. 368 [149 Pac. 821] ; Ex· parte Wil~
liams, supra.) It also lies to test whether the complaint
charges a ptlblic offense (Ex parte lFilliams, 121 Cal. 328 [53
Pac. 706] ; Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 1G4 [19 Pac. 237, 11
Am. St. Rep. 257] ; People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N. Y.
410 [80 N. E. 3S3, 10 Ann. Cas, 309, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 528] ;
see, also, 13 Cal. Jur. 232, sec. 14; 25 Am. Jur. 174, sec. 42;
and 35 Columbo L. Rev. 850 at 862) even though this question
falls within the jurisd1ction of the trial court anu may he
raised on appeal. Certaln courts go so far as to permit the
use of habeas corp"Gs before trial when the statute of limitations has run uplln the offense charged. (United States V.
Mathues, 27 Fed. (211) 137; 81.;e Ex parte rice, 5 Cal. App.
153 [89 Pac. 983] ; People v. McGee, 1 Cal. (2<1) 611 [36 Pac.
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(2d) 378]; People V. Hoffman, ] 32 Cal. App. 60 [22 Pac.
(2d) 229] ; see 35 Colu:mh. L. Rev. 407.)
[2] While a few courts require that all available remedies by
appeal be exhausted before l1a1eas corpus can be invokeu to
test constitutionality (~ce Qoto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393 [44
S. Ct. 525, 68 L. Ed. 1070]), most jurisdictions, including
California, do not make the r'cquireI!"lCnt mandatory (see cases
collected in 13 Cal. Jur. 225, sec. 8; 2·5 Am. Jur. 164, sec. 29),
and even permit the issue of eonstitutionality to be raised by
habeas corpus b~fore trial. (Ibid, Matter of Zany, 20 Cal.
App. 3GO [129 Pac. 295]; Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241
[6 S. Ct. 734, 29 L. Ed. 868]; contra, Glasgow v. Moyer,
225 U. S. 4:20 [32 S. Ct. 753, 56 L. Ed. 1147] ; Johnson V.
Hoy, 227 U. S. 245 [33 S. Ct. 240, 57 L. Ed. 497].) Since
the granting uf u writ of habeas corpus, however, results in
the release of the petitioner, while reversal on appeal may
result merclyin a new trial with the flxclusion of those charges
found based on ullconstitutional enactments or the inclusion
of that procedure found constitutio!lally guarantecd, the court
may in its discretion refuse to grant the writ if the remedy
by appeal is not exhausted. This rule, adopt~d by the federal
courts (In reLancaster, 137 U. S. 393 [11 S. Ct. 117, 34 L.
Ed. 713]; In re Chapman, 156 U. S. 211 [15 S. Ct. 331,
39 L. Ed. 401] ; R~'ggins v. United St:dcs, 199 U. S. 547 [26
S. Ct. 147, 50 L. Ed. 303]; United States v. Sing Tuck,
194 U. S. 161 [24 S. Ct. 621, 48 L. Ed. 917]; Henry v.
Henkel, 235 U. S. 219 [35 S. Ct. 54, 59L. Ed. 203]; see
35 Columbo L. Hev. 404 at 412, 41 1), should also be followed
by the courts of thjs st::l.te.
[lb] In the present case petitioners, having exhausted their
remedy by appeal, seek by habeas corpus to assert the invalidity
of the ordinance as a whole. Habeas corpus is not merely
the proper remedy under such circumstances but the only one
that will enable this court to decide upon the constitutionality
ofr·the ordinance.
[3] The ordinance must be judged on its face to determine
whether it unconstitutionally prohibits acts that fall within
the category of peaceful picketing. (l lhornhill v. Alabama,
310 U. S. 88 [60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093]; Carlson v.
California, 310 U. S. 106 [60 S. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104];
Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 518 [59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L.
Ed. 1423] ; Schneider V. State, 308 U. S. 147, 162-165 [60 S.
l
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Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155] ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451
[58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949]; Stromberg v. California,
283 U. S. 359, 369, 370 [51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117].
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 [51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L.
Ed. 1357]; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 [6 S. Ct.
1064, 30 L. Ed. 220].) If ce~tain of its provisions operate
to prohibit peaceful picketing, they are invalid even though
they also prohibit acts that may properly be made illegal.
A penal statute that" does not aim specifically at evils within
the allowable area of State control, but on the contrary,
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary cir·
cumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of
the press ... lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups
deemed to merit their displeasure" and "results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that
might reasonably be regarded as within its purview." (Thornhill v. Alabama, supra at 97.) It is not the function of the
court to determine whether the restrictions imposed by the
legislation can be validly applied to the facts of a particular
case. ' 'Proof of an abuse of power in the particular case has
never been deemed a requisite for attack on the constitutionality of a statute purporting to license the dissemination of
ideas." (Thornhill v. Alabama, supra at 97 ; Hague v. C. I. 0.,
supra)' Lovell v. Griffin, supra; Schneider v. State, supra.)
Language prohibiting conduct that may be prohibited and
conduct that may not affords no reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt and is therefore too uncertain and vague to be
enforced. (Stromberg v. California, s~{,pra, 369-370; Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 261-263 [57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed.
1066] ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 [59 S. Ct.
618, 83 L. Ed. 888]; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 [57
S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278]; Hague v. C. I. 0., supra;
Schneider v. State, supra; In re Harder, 9 Cal. App. (2d)
153, 155 [49 Pac. (2d) 304] ; Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha,
48 Fed. (2d) 171.) A conviction based upon such a statute
cannot stand even though the acts of misconduct in the particular case could be validly prohibited by properly drafted
legislation. (Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Carlson v. California, supra.)
[4] Section 2 of the present ordinance makes it a crime" for
any person to loiter, stand, or sit upon any public highway,
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alley, sidewalk or crosswalk so as to in any manner hinder
or obstruct the free passage ... of persons or vehicles ... ".
This language encompasses conduct that is well within the
bOllnds of peaceful picketing sanctioned by the guarantees of
due process of law. Thus a picket may be peaceful even
though he loiters, stands, or sits upon a public highway, alley,
sidewalk, or crosswalk, and thereby constitutes to some extent
an obstruction to the free passage of persons and vehicles or
an annoyance to persons who do not approve of his presence.
(See Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Carlson v. California,
supra; In re Harder, supra; Territory of HawaVi v. Anduha,
supra; In re Williams, 158 Cal. 550 [111 Pac. 1035].) The
sweeping prohibition of section 2 would apply equally against
peaceful pickets, shoppers engrossed in a window display,
invalids in wheelchairs,· acquaintanc~s who stand engaged in
conversation. The entire section is therefore invalid even
though Yuba County might validly prohibit excessive and unnecessary obstruction 0.£ the streets and highways.
[5] Section 3 of the ordinance likewise makes conduct generally recognized as peaceful picketing unlawful. Peaceful
picketing in the course of a labor dispute involves besetting
the premises of another for the purpose of inducing employees
to quit their employment or dissuading others from seeking
employment. The fact that to some extent compulsion, coercion, intimidation, or threats are employed does not detract
from its peaceful nature so long as they constitute only economic,moral, or social pressure and not the pressure of violence. (See McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Local
Union No. 1067, 16 Cal. (2d) 311 [106 Pac. (2d) 373] ; Park:.
inson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581 [98 Pac.
1027, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 550; Lisse v.
Local Union No. 31, 2 Cal. (2d) 312 [41 Pac. (2d) 314];
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70 [103 Pac. 324].)
The character of the picketing js determined not by the
existence of a threat but by what is actually threatened.
(See dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 [44 N. E.I077, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443,
35 L. R. A. 722].) A picket may point to the possibility of
ousting from the union any employee crossing the picket line
and thereby compel or coerce bim to quit his employment. The
provisions of section 3 prohibiting such conduct are invalid.
[6] That part of section 3, however, prohibiting picketing
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by acts of violence is yalh.l, fur tlIt re is no crmstitutional sanction for violence in lahor Ui~~):ltcS. 'VIlCIl vart of a statute is
declared uncollstituti()] wI, t1!c fl'l!1:lilldcr will st[md if it is
complete in itself and woulU ]1.1Y(' IIe'cn adoptcd hy tho legislative body had the latter foreseen t~,c parlial invaliuation of the
statute. (Ex parte Fra.zer, 54 Cnl. !.H:; 5 Cal. Jur. 614; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations (~th e.ll.) , vol. 1, p. 3GO.) Not
only is the valid part of the present ordinance complete in
itself, but the ordinance provides: "If any section, su bsection, sentence, clause or phrase of this ordinance is fur allY
reason held to be unconstitutiollal or invalid, such (iccif..lon
shall not affect the validity or eonstitutionality of the remaining portions of this ordinance." (See Bacon Service (tori), v.
Russ, 199 Cal. 21 [248 Pac. 235].)
[7] The provisions of sect jon. 3 prohibiting picketin~ by acts
of violence do not conflict with t.he general laws of tlll! state
relating to assault, hattery, riot, !isturhing the peace, and
unlawful assemblage. An ordinance is iIrvalicl if it lJlakes
illegal the same acts that are made illegal by the general 1:1. ws
of the state. (Cal. Canst., art. XI, sec. 11; Ex parte Sic, 73
Cal. 142 [14 Pac. 405] ; In re Mingo, 190 Cal. 7GD [214 Pac.
850] ; In re Mttrphy, 190 Cal. 2Ci6 [212 Pac. 30] ; Ex pl~rte
Stephen, 114 Cal. 278 [46 Pac. b6] ; Ex l)llrte ])a'nicls, 183
Cal. 63G [lU2 Pac. 442, 21 A. L. R. 1172].) Picketir:g by acts
of violence, however, is an off.er..se distinct from a~sault, battery, riot, disturbing the pea(>e, orun1awful assemblage, even
though it may sometimes involve these acts. The nature , •. I a
crime involving violence varies with the purpose for' wbieh
the violence is employed. This or,1inance prohibits tbe use
of violence for the purpose of preventing employees or pn.trvns
from entering premises being picketc(~ in connection with n
labor dispute. It therefore defines an offense different fron:
general acts of violence unconnected with a 1abor controversy.
[8] When a petitioner has been convicted of violating- a statute that is entirely unconstitutional, the court will ortl.inarily
issue a writ of habeas corpus ,releasing him from custody.
The present ordinance, however, contains a valid lJrovision
prohibiting acts of violence. The complaint charges petitioners with picketing by acts of violence and therefore charges a
public offense for such acts are not consistent with lawful
action. (See cases cited in 13 Cal. Jur., pp. 235, 236, note 7;
ct. Ex parte P~terson, 119 Cal. 578 [51 Pac. 859] ; Ex parte
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McLaughlin, 16 Cal. App. 270 [116 Pac. 684]; In re Hernandez, 64 Cal. App. 71 [220 Pac. 423] ; Ex parte Greenall, 153
Cal. 767 [96 Pac. 804] ; In re AhSing, 156 Cal. 349 [104 Pac.
448].) Since the punishment imposed on petitioners is not
excessive for violation of the valid provision of the ordinance,
they can be released by habeas corpus only if it is clear that
they were not convicted of violating that provision. (Ex parte
Morrison, 88 Cal. 112 [25 Pac. 1064].)
[9a] The uncertainty surrounding their conviction arises
. from the ambiguity of the complaint, which charged them with
violating anyone" and/or" any other provision of the ordinance, count 1 referring to section 2 and count 2 referring to
section 3. Petitioners were in effect charged with violating
all the provisions of each section of the ordinance or anyone
provision of each section. They were found guilty "as
charged" and sentenced "on said conviction." It cannot
therefore be determined from the face of the record whether
or not they were found guilty of violating the one valid provision of section 3.
The expression "and/or", which made possible a conviction
couched in such general terms, has met with widespread condemnation. (Oochrane v. Florida East Ooast Ry. 00., 107 Fla.
431 [145 So. 217]; Preble v. Architectural Iron Workers
Union, 260 Ill. App. 435; Tarjan v. National S~trety 00., 268
Ill. App. 232; State v. Dudley, 159 La. 872 [106 So. 364] ;
Russell v. Empire Storage &7 Ice 00., 332 Mo. 707 [59 S. W.
(2d) 1061]; State v. Douglas, 339 Mo. 187 [95 S. W. (2d)
1179] ; Drummond v. Oity of Oolumbus, 136 Neb. 87 [285
N. W. 109, 286 N. W. 779] ; Kornbrodt v. Eqttitable Trust
00.,137 Ore. 386 [2 Pac. (2d) 236, 3 Pac. (2d) 127] ; Allen
v. State, 138 Tex. Cr. 303 [136 S. W. (2d) 232]; Oobb v.
State, 139 Tex. Cr. 337 [139 S. W. (2d) 272] ; Putnam v. Industrial Oommission, 80 Utah 187 [14 Pac. (2d) 973]; Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. 00. v. Tollefson, 219 Wjs. 434
[263 N. W. 376] ; An And/Or Symposium, 18 A. B. A. J ournal 574; 18 A. B. A. Journal 456, 524 (editorials) ; 42 West Va.
L. Q. 235; H. H. Parsons, And/Or, 10 Cal. State Bar, J. 89,
cf. H. Mumper, Unfair Tirade Against the Symbol
"And/Or", 10 Cal. State Bar. J.187.) It is true that the expression has proved convenient in contracts and other instruments
where, by its intentional equivocation, it can anticipate alternative possibilities without the cumbersome itemization of each
one. (118 A. L. R. 1.367; 43 Yale L. J. 918, 20 Marquette L.
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Rev. 101.) It lends itself, however, as much to ambiguity as
to brevity. rrhus it cannot intelligibly be used to fix the occurrence of past events. A purported conclusion that either one
or both of two events occurred is a mere restatement of the
problem, not a decision as to which event actually occurred.
If a person is accu,sed of violating an unconstitutional as well
as a constitutional provision of a statute and the verdict by
the use of "and/or" declares him guilty of violating either
one or both provisions, it is anopen question whether he is guilty
of any punishable offense. The verdict in effect states that the
accused is guilty or innocent of violating the constitutional provision. A comparable lack of precision was censured by the
United States Supreme Court in Stromberg v. California, 283
U. S. 359, 368 [51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117, 73 A. L. R.
14.84] : "rrbe verdict against the appellant was a general one. It
did not specify the ground upon which it rested. As there were
three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury was instructed that their verdict rpight be given with respect to any
OTIC of them, independently considered, it is impossibl e to say
under which clause of the statute the conviction was olJtained.
If anyone of these clauses, which the state court has held to
be separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this
record t.hat the appellant was not convicted under that clause.
... It follows that instead of its being permissible to hold,
with the state court, that the verdict could be sustained if
anyone of the clauses of the statute were found to be valid,
the necessary conclusion from the manner in which the case
was sent to the jury is that, if any of the clauses in question
is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld. " The ambiguity of the judgment in the present case would thus clearly warrant a reversal of the conviction
on appeal or other direct attack. (See, also, People v.Moss,
33 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.), 763, 767 [87 Pac. (2d) 932] ; People v. Tomlinson, 35 Cal. 503, 508.)
A habeas corpus proceeding, however, is in the nature of a
collateral attack, and a judgment that is collaterally attacked
carries with it a presumption of regularity. (Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 468 [58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461] ;
see 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.) 780, et seq.; 15 Cal. Jur.
64, et seq.) This presumption of regularity applies to the proceedings of a justice's court only if the judgment affirmatively
shows, as in the present case, that the court has jurisdiction over
person and subject matter. (Brush v. Smith, 141 Cal. 466 [75
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Pac. 55]; Hayward v. Pimental, 107 Cal. 386 [40 Pac. 545];
Rowley v. Howard, 23 Cal. 401, 404. See 15 Cal. Jur. 503; 6 Cal.
Jur. Supp. 611.) The presumption, however, is not conclusive
in a habeas corpus proceeding but places upon petitioners the
burden of proving that their convictions were based not upon the
constitutional but upon the unconstitutional provisions· of the
ordinance. (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra.) Unless they can sustain
this burden they must be considered as having been convicted of
violating the valid provision relating to acts of violence, and the
judgment must be upheld.
.
[10] A petitioner seeking habeas corpus, however, is not confined to the face of the record in attempting to sustain the bur·
den of proving that his conviction was in violation of his consti~
tutional rights. The courts of both the United States and California have declared that the remedy of habeas corpus permits an examination not only of the actual evidence introduced at petitioner's trial but of any necessary additional evidence bearing upon the infringement of petitioner's constitutional rights. (Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 [43 S. Ct.
265, 67 L. Ed. 543] ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 [55
S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A. L.R. 406]; Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U. S. 242[57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066];
Johnson v. Zerbst, supra; In re Connor, 15 Cal. (2d) 161 [99
Pac. (2d) 248]; In ,"e. Connolly, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 709 [61
Pac. (2d) 490] ; In re Lake, 65 Cal. App. 420[224 Pac. 126] ;
In re Chaus, 92 Cal. App. 384- [268 Pac. 422] ; see, also, Fiske
v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 [47 S. Ct. 655, 71 L. Ed. 1108];
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 [57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed.
278] ; Norris v. Alabama, 294U. S. 587 [55 S. Ct. 579, 79
L. Ed. 1074]; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 [53 S. Ct.
55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527].) This examination is
made, not to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence. to support the verdict, but to determine what the verdict actually
was, so that the court may decide whether it violates constitutional guaranties. Such an examination will be made in a
habeas corpus proceeding whenever a petitioner has been de·
prived of due process of law, whatever form that deprivation
has taken. If a court has no "jurisdiction" to enter a judgment against a defendant after depriving him of such constitutional guarantees as the right to counselor to a fair trial
free from mob domination, it has no "jurisdiction" to enter
a judgment against him based upon an unconstitutional statute. An examination of the facts is permissible to determine
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whether a petitioner was denied due process of law with respect to the procedure at his trial; it is no less permissible to
determine whether he was denied due process of law by being
convicted of violating unconstitutional legislation.
In Herndon v. Lowry, supra, a defendant was convicted of
the crime of attempting to incite an insurrection. On appeal·
from a denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
United States Supreme Court examined the evidence introduced at his trial, concluded that it revealed only conduct
that was protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, and held that his conviction under the statute
was therefore a denial of due process of law requiring the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
In Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, a defendant petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he had been deprived
of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel at his
trial. The court held that petitioner was entitled to a release
on habeas corpus if an examination of the facts supported his
allegation, stating, "a prisoner in custody pursuant to the
final judgment of a state court of criminal jurisdiction may
have a judicial inquiry in a court of the United States into
the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention, although it may become necessary to look behind and beyond
the record of his conviction. . . ." (p. 466.)
In Moore v. Dempsey, supra, petitioners asked for release by
habeas corpus on the grounds that they had been deprived of
due process of law because of mob domination of their trial.
The court held that the actual facts should be examined to
determine the truth of the allegations. In Mooney v. Holohan, supra, the court stated that an examination must be made
of facts outside the record to determine whether petitioner was
deprived of due process of law at his trial.
The cases of Fiske v. Kansas, supra; De J onge v. Oregon,
supra; Norris v. Alabama; supra; and Powell v. Alabama,
supra, all hold that an examination should be made of the
evidence introduced in the trial court whenever it is essential
to a proper determination of constitutional questions. While
not involving writs of habeas corpus, these cases mark the extent of the protection afforded by constitutional guaranties
and are therefore applicable to habeas corpus proceedings
concerned with infringement of constitutional rights. In N or~
ris v. Alabama, supra, the court stated: "That the question
is one of fact does not relieve us of the duty to determine
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whether in truth a federal right has been denied. When a
federal right has been specially set up and claimed in a state
court, it is our province to inquire not merely whether it was
denied in express terms but also whether it was denied in
substance and effect. If this requires an examination of evidence, that examination must be made. Otherwise, review by
this Court would fail of its purpose in safeguarding constitutionalrights. "
The California cases are equally clear that on habeas corpus
a court may examine the evidence introduced at the trial if
necessary to determine properly the constitutional question
at issue. In the case of In re Connor, S1.tpra, this court, following an application for a writ of habeas corpus, examined
a transcript of statements made by petitioner at his arraignment to determine whether he had been deprived of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel at his trial. The
court, treating the constitutional question as a jurisdictional
one, stated: "Furthermore, the function of habeas corpus is
to test the jurisdiction of the court to render judgment. It is
not limited to the face of the proceeding, but extends to the
record of the court below when necessary to determine jurisdiction." The District Court of Appeal in the case of In re
Connelly, supra, declared: "But the respondent argues that
the rule cannot be applied unless the fact of immunity appears on the face of the indictment. The argument is based
upon the all-too-broad statement that the function of habeas
corpus is limited to the question of jurisdiction as it appears
on the face of the proceedings. The accepted rule in this state
(and the only one applicable under the code sections cited
above) is clearly stated in In re Lake, 65 Cal. App. 420, 423
[224 Pac. 126], where the court says: ' . . . While neither
writ [habeas corpus or certiorari] is one of error, both extend
to the entire record of the court below and to the evidence itself when necessary to determine jurisdiction.' " .Penal Code
section 1484, moreover, provides that on habeas corpus proceedings the petitioner may "allege any fact to show either
that his imprisonment or dete~tion is unlawful, or that he is
entitled to his discharge. The court or judge must thereup0n
proceed in a summary way to hear such proof as may be produced against such imprisonment or detention, or in favor of
the same, and to dispose of such party as the justice of the
case may require, and have full power and authority to require and compel the attendance of witnesses, by process or
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subpoena and attachment, and to do and perform all other
acts and things necessary to a full and fair hearing and determination of the case."
It is clear from the foregoing authorities that in a habeas
corpus proceeding a court must look beyond the face of the
record at the actual evidence when necessary to determine
whether a petitioner has been deprived of constitutional rights.
If the statute under which the petitioner was convicted is
entirely unconstitutional, the court will discharge him on
habeas corpus without examining the evidence. Conversely,
if the statute is entirely constitutional, the conviction will be
upheld without examination of the evidence. [9b] If, however,
as in the present case, the statute is in part constitutional and
in par;t unconstitutional and it cannot be determined from the
eharge and conviction whether or not petitioner was tried and
convicted for violating the va~id part, the court must examine the evidence, not to test whether it is sufficient to support
a verdict, but to determine whether petitioner was tried and
convicted for violating the invalid part alone, in which case
the conviction must fall, or whether he was tried and convicted for violating the valid part as well, in which case the
conviction must stand.. The petitioner has the burden of proving that he was not tried and convicted for violating the valid
part of the statute.
[11] Petitioners in the present case have failed to sustain
the burden of proving that they were not tried and convicted for
acts of violence since the transcripts of testimony at their
trials reveal evidence of such acts. Some of the petitioners,
along with 75 to 100 other men and women, were engaged
in picketing the entrance to the Reed Ranch while others w.ere
in a large group picketing the entrance to the DatoniOrchard.
Witnesses testified that at the Reed Ranch a large group of
pickets stood in the middle of the road and refused to move
when automobiles approached, thus forcing the automobiles to
stop. An officer testified that he could have driven on only if
he "had wanted to kill somebody." Petitioners Bell, Davis
and Walker participated in the stopping of cars. Bell was
quoted as saying: "We are going to stop every damned automobile that comes in here." Davis, according to a witness,
walked up and down the middle of the road giving orders "to
stop every car that comes through here." Walker stated that
"he was going to stop every damn automobile and to hell with
the law. He would take care of them personally." Some of
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the automobiles were permitted to go through after having
been stopped but no automobile, other than one used by
officers, passed through the blockade at the Reed Ranch before
the arrival of two deputy sheriffs.
The witness Newcomb testified that he was forced to stop
at the Datoni Orchard about 3 :10 a. m. by a large group of
men standing across the road waving flashlights. They gathered about his car and ordered him to go back. A flashlight
picture taken by a photographer at the scene shows seventeen men grouped about the car, eight of them directly in'
front of it. The photographer testified that there were about
65 men on the road and that Newcomb immediately turned
around and left. Petitioners Knapp, Hamilton, Hinman,
Wiseman, Day, and McKay were in this group and participated in the stopping of cars. Witnesses present at the Reed
Ranch and the Datoni Orchard testified that the pickets' action caused them to fear bodily harm.
[12] This evidence reveals conduct exceeding the bounds
of peaceful picketing. Pickets may bring themselves to the notice of persons entering the picketed premises, but may not
forcibly stop automobiles and intimidate the occupants by
gathering in large numbers. Such action is more than peaceful persuasion. It is forceful intimidation and constitutes
violence.
Because petitioners have failed to sustain the burden of
proving that they were not convicted of the one valid provision of the ordinance prohibiting acts of violence, the writ
heretofore issued is discharged and the petitioners are remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Yuba County.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Houser, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J., Concurring.-Although I agree that the
petitioners are not entitled to be released upon the writ of
habeas corpus, the scope of the review, in my opinion, has
been extended beyond that which the law allows.
The petitioners were convicted under a complaint which
charged them both in the conjunctive and disjunctive with
the violation of each section of the ordinance. They now contend that, since a conviction upon charges of peaceful picketing would be an infringement of their constitutional rights,
this court is not confined to the complaint and the judgment
in considering the issues presented· in this proceeding but
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may look behind the record of conviction and examine the
evidence adduced at the trial to determine whether the conviction was for acts which are included within the unconstitutional portions of the ordinance. This argument requires
some consideration of the nature and function of the writ' of
habeas corpus.
Generally speaking, the scope of review on habeas corpus
is limited to an examination of the jurisdiction of the court
whose judgment of conviction is challenged. (Ex parte Parks,
93 U. S. 18 [23 L. Ed. 787] ; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S.371
[25 L. Ed. 717]; Knewel v. Egan, 268 U. S. 442 [45 S. Ct.
522, 69 L. Ed. 1036] ; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 [59
S. Ct. 442, 83 L. Ed. '455]; Ex parte Sternes, 77 Cal. 156
[19 Pac. 275, 11 Am. St. Rep. 251] ; Ex parte Long, 114 Cal.
159 [45 Pac. 1057] ; In re Oarpenter, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 274
[97 Pac. (2d) 476].) The writ may not be employed as a
vehicle for the correction of errors or irregularities committed within the exercise of an admitted jurisdiction. (Ex
parte Olarke, 10.0 U. S. 399 [25 L. Ed. 715] ; Ex parte Siebold,
supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 [58 S. Ct. 1019,
82 L. Ed. 1461] ; 13 Cal. Jur. 218.) Nor may it be used as a
device to test the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the
conviction of the petitioner, a question properly addressed to
a reviewing court upon appeal. (Harlan v. McGourin. 218
U. S. 442 [31 S. Ct. 44, 54 L. Ed. 1101]; In re Jacobs, 175
Cal. 661 [166 Pac. 801] ; In re Willliams, 183 Oal. 11 [190 Pac.
163J ; In re Stevenson, 187 Oal. 773 [204 Pac. 216] ; Ex parte
Drew, 188 Oal. 717 [207 Pac. 249] ; 13 Oal. Jur. 219.) These
are traditional and fundamental principles from which there
has been no departure, and although in recent times the concept of jurisdiction has been broadened upon habeas corpus,
,the question of the guilt or innocence of the petitioner is
never a proper subject of inquiry.
Furthermore, a judgment challenged by a writ of habeas
corpus carries with it a presumption of validity, and every
reasonable intendment must be made in its favor. (Johnson v.
Zerbst, supra, at p. 468; In re Pillsbury, 69 Cal. App. 784
[232 Pac. 725] ; 15 Oal. Jur. 64.) The proceeding is subject
to the rules applicable to collateral assault upon judgments
generally. (In re Stevenson, supra; Ex parte Stephen, 114
Oal. 278 [46 Pac. 86].) The presumption of validity, however, is rebuttable when the ~urisdiction of the convicting
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court is called into question, and in pursuing its inquiry into
the challenged jurisdiction, the petitioned court is not confined to the face of the judgment of conviction but may review
the entire proceeding below, including an examination not
only of the facts disclosed by the record but of any additional
facts, outside of, but not inconsistent with, the record. (Re
Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176 [9 S. Ot. 672, 33 L. Ed. 118]; Re
Ouddy, 131 U. S. 280 [9 S. Ot. 703, 33 L. Ed. 154J ; In re
Mayfield, 141 U. S. 107 [11 S. ot. 939, 35 L. Ed. 635].)
However, as to all matters not affecting the jurisdiction of
the court, the presumption of regularity attaching to the judgment of conviction is conclusive and unrebuttable, and any
inquiry beyond the face of the judgment is foreclosed. To
hold otherwise, would permit the writ of habeas corpus to be
used as a means of correcting error or of testing the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, the presumption that
petitioners were convicted under the constitutional portions
of the picketing ordinance must be deemed conclusive and an
examination of the evidence upon which that conviction was
had is improper unless the jurisdiction of the justice's court
has been adequately challenged by the allegations of the
petition.
As the courts have defined jurisdiction in recent years, it
includes the right to hear .and determine concerning the
offense charged and the authority of the court to act in a
given manner over the person of the accused. (Fortenbury v.
Superior Oourt, 16 Oal. (2d) 405 [106 Pac. (2d) 411].)
If during the course of a criminal prosecution the ac,cused is deprived of certain fundamental procedural rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Oonstitution of the United States, a judgment of conviction subsequently entered is invalid for lack of jurisdiction. (J ohnson
v. Zerbst, supra; Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 369 [61 S. Ct.
572, 85 L. Ed. 859] ; In re Oonnor, 15 Oal. (2d) 161 [99 Pac.
(2d) 248] [denial of the right to counsel] ; Frank v. Mangum,
237 U. S. 309 [35 S. Ot. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969]; Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 [43 S. Ot. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543] [trial
dominated by mob violence] ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510
[47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749] [denial of the right to an
impartial judge].) The remedy of habeas corpus is available
to a petitioner asserting a lack of jurisdiction in any of the
respects above set forth, and the petitioned court may look
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from under which clause of section 647 the conviction was
had. In discharging the writ, the court declared, "we cannot assume; for the purpose of passing on this question, or of
discharging the prisoner, that this is the particular clause
under which the judgment of conviction was had." And in
In re Dal Porte, 198 Cal. 216 [244 Pac. 355], petitioner was
charged and convicted under two counts, one of which stated
an offense beyond the jurisdiction of the court to try. As the
finding of guilt was general, it was impossible to ascertain
whether the conviction was based upon either or both counts.
Admitting that the judgment was erroneous and subject to
correction on appeal, the court nevertheless declared: "We
are not prepared to say, however, that petitioner is entitled
in this proceeding to any relief from said judgment on account
of its being based upon a defective count of the complaint.
As we have already seen, the charge set forth in the second
count of said complaint was one within the jurisdiction of
said police court, and the fact that the offense charged in
the first count of said complaint was one over which said
police court did not have jurisdiction would not be sufficient
to oust the court of jurisdiction of the offense over which it
had full and complete jurisdiction."
.
But I agree that if the records of the trials which resulted
in the petitioners' conviction may be examined for the purpose of determining whether the petitioners committed acts
of violence and physical intimidation, there is substantial
evidence to support the judgments which are attacked in this
proceeding. For although labor may present its grievances
to the public, the obstruction of access to an employer's place
of business by such number of persons as to require his employees who desire to work to run'the gauntlet under threats
of physical harm is not protected by the constitutional guaranties.
Many years ago, this court held that an intentional interference with the relations of an employer and his employees
is not tortious if the object sought to be attained has reasonable relevance to labor conditions and peaceful means are
used to accomplish it. (Parkinson 00. v. B-uilding Trades
Council, 154 Cal. 581 [98 Pac. 1027, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165,21
L. R. A. (N. S.) 550].) That principle was recently restated
and applied in holding "that workmen may associate together and exert various forms of economic pressure upon
I..'

~
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employers, provided they act peaceably and honestly. " However, the court laid particular emphasis upon the requirement
that labor's acts must be peaceful if they are to come within
the protection of the law. Fully recognizing "that the right
to picket peacefully and truthfully is one of organized labor's
lawful means of advertising its grievances to the public, and
as such is guaranteed by the Constitution as an incident of
freedom of speech," it also added: "But the law clearly requires that concerted action by union workers must be peaceful. Acts of violence or 'acts amounting to physical intimidation' will be enjoined." (McKay v. Retail Auto S. L.
Union No. 1067, 16 Cal. (2d) 311 [106 Pac. (2d) 373].)
The testimony which is referred to in the opinion of my
associates, and other evidence which is shown by the record,
fully justifies a conclusion that the picketing, carried on, in
part, under cover of darkness and with a show of force
toward employees of the Earl Fruit Co. who desired to continue their employment entirely out of proportion to any
peaceful purpose, was accompanied by such violence, or
threats of violence, as to constitute unlawful means. To say
that it comes within the bounds of peaceful picketing is to
ignore the realities of the situation.
When pickets patrol the public street which is the approach
to their employer's premises and either their number .or their
conduct is such as to constitute intimidation and put employees or others in fear of bodily harm, they are guilty of
unlawful acts. Such picketing goes far beyond that which
has been recognized by the courts as a reasonable exercise of
the right to· tell the facts of a labor dispute and to persuade
employees, by peaceful means, to leave their work. The courts
have generally recognized that persuasion in the presence of
a large number of persons is not peaceful persuasion, and in
one of its decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States
said that it is the proper function of a court of equity "to
prevent the inevitable intimidation of . . . groups of pickets,
but to allow missionaries. . . . In going to and from work,
men have a right to as free passage without obstruction as
the streets afford, consistent with the right of others to enjoy
the same privilege." (American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Oity
Oentral Trades Oouncil, 257 U. S. 184 [42 S. Ct. 72, 66
L. Ed. 189].)
In the very recent case of Milk WagOtn Drive'!'s Uniop. III
Ohicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 28"1
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[61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836, 132 A. L. R. 1200], (rehearing denied, 312 U. S. 715 [61 S. Ct. 803, 85 L. Ed. 1145]),
the same court laid down the requirement that, to be lawful,
picketing must be peaceful and may not have a background
of violence. "Peaceful picketing," said the court, "is the
workingman's means of communication. It must never be
forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of
the Enlightenment. Back of the guarantee of free speech lay
faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful
means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to
avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon ration'al
modes of communication that the guarantee of free speech
was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of
violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and
become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was
not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution."
The petitioners in that case,as in the one now before this
court, relied upon the decision of Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U. S. 88, 105 [60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093]. But, as
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out, there. was no "entanglement with violence" in either the Thornhill case or in Carlson
v. California, 310 U. S. 106 [60 S. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104],
where the court declared: "The power and duty of the State
to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and protect the
privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot
be doubted." Concerning the former case, he said that the
court expressly excluded a labor dispute involving violence
from the scope of its decision in these words: "Weare not
now concerned with picketing en masse or otherwise conducted which might occasion such imminent and aggravated
danger . . . as to justify a statute narrowly drawn to cover
the precise situation giving rise -to the danger." The Yuba
County ordinance, in so far as its valid severable provisions
are concerned, is exactly such a statute.
Curtis, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., dissenting.-I dissent.
In my opinion petitioners are entitled to their release on
habeas corpus upon the ground that the provisions of the
ordinance under which they were charged and convicted are
unconstitutional and void.
Since the majority of the court seem to agree that section 2
of the ordinance is invalid, but sustain the validity of the
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judgment of conviction against the petitioners under Section 3 of said ordinance, .I will confine my discussion to section 3 only.
Said section provides: "Section 3. It is unlawful for any
person to beset or picket the premises of another, or any
approach thereto, where any person is employed or seeks
employment, or any place or approach thereto where such
employee or person seeking employment lodges or resides, for
the purpose of inducing such employee or person seeking
employment, by means of compulsion, coercion, intimidation,
threats, acts of violence, or fear, to quit his or her employment or to refrain from seeking or freely entering into employment. "
In my opinion the above-quoted section is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that it cannot be said to denounce as
a crime any act which may be proscribed under the police
power of the state, and fails to provide a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt.
Before making an analysis of the above-quoted section, I
shall call attention to certain rules applicable to the interpretation of statutes and ordinances. They are as follows:
"When the language' of an act appears on its face to have
a meaning, but it is impossible to give it any precise or intelligible application in the circumstances under which it was
intended to operate, it is simply void; for if no judicial certainty can be settled upon as to its meaning, courts are not
at liberty to supply the deficiency or make the statute certain.
But legislation cannot be nullified on the ground of uncertainty, if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will
support it." (26 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 2d Ed., 656.)
"Where the statutory terms are of such uncertain meaning,
or so confused, that the courts cannot discern with reasonable.
certainty what is intended, they will pronounce the enactment void." (Statutory Crimes, 3d Ed., in the third subdivision of section 41.)
"Statutes and ordinances which fix crimes, or quasi crimes,
should so fix them that there could be no uncertainty. They
should be so worded that one could read them, and know
whether or not he was violating law. They should not be so
worded as to leave their substantive elements to the caprices
of either judge or jury. In other words the law should be
complete and definite. What would be 'reasonable effort'
under this law is left a question for the court or jury. What
19 O. (2d)-17
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in the minds of one court or jury might be 'reasonable effort'
might not be so considered by another court or jury. Each
trial tribunal would be making its own ordinance. This will
not do for a law or ordinance criminal in character." (Taft
v. Shaw, 284 Mo. 531 [225 S. W. 457].)
"It is equally true that a mere collection of words can not
constitute a law; otherwise the dictionary can be transformed
into a statute by the proper legislative formula. An act of
the legislature, to be enforceable as a law, must prescribe a
rule of action, and such rule must be intelligibly expressed."
(St·ate ex info Crow V. West Side Street Ry. Co., 146 Mo. 155
[47 S. W. 959].)
"An ordinance of a regulatory nature must be clear, cer-.
tain and definite, so that the average man may with due care
after reading the same understand whether he will incur a.
penalty for his actions or not." (19 R. O. L., p. 810.)
". . . in creating an offence the legislature may define it
by a particular description of the act or acts constituting it,
or may define it as any act which produces, or is reasonably
calculated to produce certain defined or described results."
(8 R. O. L., p. 57.)
Applying the foregoing rules to the ordinance under consideration, it is clear to my mind that the language contained
therein is insufficient to charge an offense within the purview of the police power of the state in view of the recent
decisions of the Supreme Oourt of the United States holding
that "The freedom of speech and of the press, which are
secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the
United States, are among the fundamental persona,! rights
and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a state. . . ."
(Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 [60 S. Ot. 736, 84
L. Ed. 1093]; Oarlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 [60 SCt. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104J ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 [58
S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949]; Schneider V. State, 308 U. S.
147 [60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L; Ed. 155] ; Gitlow v. New York, 268
U. S. 652, 666 [45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138, 1145] ; Stromberg V. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368 [51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed.
1117, 1121, 73 A. L. R. 1484] ; Near V. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,
707 [51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357, 1362]; Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 244 [56 S. Ct. 444, 80
L. Ed. 660, 665]; De J onge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364
[57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278, 283]._ See, also, Palko v.
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Oonnecticut, decided December 6, 1937 [302 U. S. 319, 58
S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288].) It is also well settled that
municipal ordinances adopted under state authority constitute state action and are within the prohibition of the amendment. (Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S.
20 [28 S. Ct. 7, 52 L. Ed. 78, 12 Ann. Cas. 757] ; Home
Teleph. & Teleg. 00. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278 [33 S.
Ct. 312, 57 L. Ed. 510] ; O~tyahoga River Power Co. v. Akron,
240 U. S. 462 [36 S. Ct. 402, 60 L. Ed. 743].)
The terms, "bes:et or picket" are not defined in the ordinance here under consideration nor in any statute or court
decision of this state. (Oarlson v. California, supra.) Textwriters have defined picketing as "the marching to and fro
before the premises of an establishment involved in a dispute,
generally accompanied by the carrying and display of a sign,
placard or banner bearing· statements in connection with the
dispute. " (Section 109 Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining by Ludwig Teller.) Picketing has also been defined
by legislative enactment elsewhere as "the act of walking up
and down before any place of business . . . and the solicitation of the public or employees through word of mouth or by
printed signs or banners, that such place of business is unfair
to organized labor or to any voluntary association, group or
members of labor organizations; and by requesting through
word of mouth or signs that such place of business or employer be boycotted and not patronized by the public; and
by personal solicitation through word of mouth or signs that
employees . . . cease working in such place of business so
picketed." (Diemer V. Weiss, 343 (Mo.) 626 [122 S. W. (2d)
922].) In brief terms, picketing may be said to constitute
the dissemination of information concerning the. facts of a
labor dispute by representatives of organized labor in the
vicinity of the place where the dispute exists. (Thornhill
v. Alabama, supra.)
It now appears to be well settled by both the decisions of
this court and those of the Supreme Court of the United
States that "the dissemination of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area
of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution."
(Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Oarlson V. California, supra;
Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 [59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed..
1423J; Schneider v. State, Sup1'a; Senn v. T1:le Layers Pr'otective Union, 301 U. S. 468 [57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229].)

516

IN RE BELL.

[19 C.(2d) -

Feb. 1942.]

IN RE BELL.
[19 C. (2d) 488]

Applying the foregoing definition to section 3 of the ordinance under consideration here, we find that the ordinance
makes it "unlawful for any person to . . . picket the premises of another . . . for the purpose of inducing any employee
or person seeking employment . . . to quit his or her employment or to refrain from seeking or freely entering into
employment. "
It appears to be conceded that a statutory enactment
couched in the above-quoted language would constitute a clear
violation of the constitutional provisions both of this state
and of the United States guaranteeing such civil liberties as
freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of assem.,.
bly. (Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Carlson v. CaUfornia,
supra; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; Schneider v. Bta·te, supra.)
But it is insisted that the insertion of the words "by means
of compulsion, coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of violence, or fear," after the clause" for the purpose of inducing
such employee or person seeking employment," and before
the clause "to quit his or her employment or to refrain from
seeking or freely entering into employment" removes section 3 of said ordinance from the category of unconstitutional legislation and renders it a valid enactment prohibiting all picketing where some of the pickets in some manner or
other resort to what might be construed to mean" compulsion,
coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of violence, or fear." In
view of this argument, let us analyze the last quoted terms
and see if they have any significance whatever when used in
an ordinance designed to proscribe and prohibit acts and conduct which may be performed in the exercise of one's civil
liberties guaranteed by both our state and federal Constitutions.
If picketing constitutes the publicizing of the facts concerning a labor dispute in the vicinity of the premises where said
dispute exists, then it must follow that it was the intention
of the legislative body which enacted said ordinance to prohibit the dissemination of information concerning such labor
dispute by means of "compulsion," etc.
In my opinion this is the only interpretation or construction which can be placed upon the above-quoted language of
section 3 of said ordinance and said language is thereby
rendered meaningless. To illustrate, how can it be said that
a picket disseminated information concerning the facts of a
labor dispute by means of "compulsion," or "coercion," or
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"intimidation," or "threats," or "acts of violence," or
"fear" ? Certainly the dissemination of information by
means' of either the spoken or printed word regardless of how
loud the voice or how large the printing would not have the
effect of creating or bringing about the conditions described
as "compulsion, coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of violence, or' fear. ' , At least, it is not possible for me to imagine
a situation in which one engaged in picketing in the sense
that that term has been defined, doing anything as a picket
which would bring about a condition approaching" compulsion, coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of violence, or fear."
Picketing does not mean throwing stones; but a person en.
gaged in picketing may throw stones; picketing does not mean
wielding clubs, but a person engaged in picketing may wield
a club; picketing does not mean firing guns, but a person
engaged in picketing may fire a gun; in brief, picketing does
not mean or comprehend the commission of any act or acts
of violence, but such acts may be committed by those engaged
in picketing. It must be conceded that every act of violence
designed to injure the person or property of another now
constitutes a violation 'of some penal provision of the law.of
this state and subjects the perpetrator thereof to prosecution
and punishment, whether committed bya person engaged in
picketing' or in any other activity. There is no more reason
for saying that publicizing the facts of a labor dispute, ('r
the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a
labor dispute through pickets, may be accomplished by means
of acts of violence, than to say that preaching the gospel, lecturing on social reforms, teaching political economy or publishing a newspaper may be likewise accomplished. The fact
that acts of violence may be committed by one engaged in
any of the above pursuits does not change the character of
the pursuit nor subject it to restrictions created by legislative
enactments under an asserted exercise of the police power. In
other words, it· is the acts of violence which come within the
purview of the police power and not the picketing, preaching,
lecturing, teaching or publishing, because acts of violence
have no relation to the purpose and object to be accomplished
by any of the above-mentioned activities, including picketing,
according to the accepted definition of that word. It may be
true that a person while engaged in picketing might commit
any and every crime known to our law, but certainly the
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commission of such crimes should not be charged up against
the entire picket line or the labor organization under whose
auspices the premises are being picketed. As I read our penal
statutes, I cannot think of anything in the nature of violence,
threats of violence, or acts of violence which are not now denounced as public offenses and punishable as such. Therefore,
to enact an ordinance denouncing the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute by means of
acts of violence, places such ordinance in the category of
those denounced by the above-quoted rules as being so vague,
indefinite and uncertain that they are absolutely meaningless.
Such, in my opinion, is the situation with reference to section
3 of the ordinance here under consideration. To carry the
discussion a little further in order to disclose the absurdity
of the contention that since section 3 of said ordinance prohibits "picketing by means of acts of violence" it is a valid
exercise of the police power of the state, let us assume that the
ordinance denounced as a crime any of the following:
, 'preaching by means of acts of violence"; or "lecturing by
means of acts of violence"; or "teaching by means of acts
of violence"; or "publishing a newspaper by means of acts
of violence"; or "distributing a newspaper by means of acts
of violence"; or "parading by means of acts of violence."
Obviously, any such ordinance would be declared void on its
face as being too vague, uncertain and indefinite to constitute a public offense. The Supreme Court of Missouri by
unanimous opinion in the case of Deimer v. Weiss, supra, declared a similar ordinance void for uncertainty, and I have
not been able to find respectable authority to the contrary.
The ordinance here under consideration falls squarely
within the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242
[57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066], where a statute of the state
of Georgia purporting to prohibit acts and conduct tending
to incite insurrection was under attack. It appears from the
opinion in that case that "The petition alleged the judgment
and sentence were void and appellant's detention illegal because the statute under which he was convicted denies and
illegally restrains his freedom of speech and of assembly
and is too vague and indefinite to provide a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt, and further alleged that there had
been no adjudication by any court of the constitutional valid-
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ity of the statute as applied to appellant's conduct." (Emphasis added.) The court at page 255 of its opinion said:
"The affirmance of conviction upon the trial record necessarily gives § 56 the construction that one who seeks members for or attempts to organize a local unit of a party which
has the purposes and objects disclosed by the documents in
evidence may be found guilty of an attempt to incite insurrection.
"The questions are whether this construction and application of the statute deprives the accused of the right of free- '
dom of speech and of assembly guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and whether the statute so construed and applied furnishes a reasonably definite and ascertainable ,standdard o/guilt." (Emphasis added.)
On page 263 of its opinion in the Herndon case the court
quotes with approval from its decision in United States v.
L. Oohen Grocery 00., 255 U. S. at page 81 [41 S. Ct. 298,
65 L. Ed. 516], the following pertinent declaration:
" 'Observe that the section forbids no specific or definite
act. It confines the subject-matter of the investigatic;m which
it authorizes to no element essentially inhering in the transaction as to which it provides. It leaves open, therefore, the
widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can
foresee and the result of which no one can foreshadow or
adequately guard against. In fact, we see no reason to doubt
the soundness of the observation of the court below, in its
opinion, to the effect that, to attempt to enforce the section
would be the exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a
statute which in terms merely penalized and punished all acts
detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the court and jury ... ' (p. 89.) "
The court then concluded:
"The decisions relied on by the State held the Sherman
Law furnished a reasonable standard of guilt because it made
a standard long recognized by the common law the statutory
test.
"The statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely
to a dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a
change of government if a jury can be persuaded that he
ought to have foreseen his words would have some effect in
the future conduct of others. No reasonably ascertainable
standard of guilt is prescribed. So vague and indeterminate
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are the boundaries thus set to the freedom or speech a.ml
assembly that the law necessarily violates the guarantees of
liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment." (Italics
added.)
What is the ascertainable standard of guilt prescribed in
the ordinance here under consideration ~ The obvious answer
to this question must be that it contains no such standard.
The statement therein that "it shall be unlawful" to commit
an "act of violence" amounts to nothing more than to say
that" it is unlawful to do an unlawful act" without defining
what constitutes the unlawful act. Nowhere in the ordinance
is there any indication of what is meant by the expression
"It is unlawful for any person to beset or picket the premises of another ... for the purpose of inducing such employee
or person seeking employment, by means of compulsion, coercion, intimidation, threats, acts of violence, or fear, to quit
his or her employment or to refrain from seeking or freely
entering into employment." It is obvious that if we apply
the accepted definition of the word "picket" (to disseminate
information concerning or to publicize the facts of a labor
dispute) the italicized words become meaningless and no crime
is defined.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, in commenting upon similar
broad and sweeping provisions of an Alabama statute, made
the following comment:
"The numerous forms of conduct proscribed by section 3448
are subsumed under two offenses: the first embraces the activities of all who 'without just cause or legal excuse' 'go near
to or loiter about the premises' of any person engaged in a
lawful business for the purpose of influenCing or inducing
others to adopt any of certain enumerated courses of action;
the second, all who 'picket' the place of business of any such
person 'for the purpose of hindering, delaying or interfering
with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise of another.' It is apparent that one or the other of the offenses
comprehends every practicable method whereby the facts of a
labor dispute may be publicized in the vicinity of the place
of business of an employer. The phrase 'without just cause
or legal excuse' does not in any effective manner restrict the
breadth of the regulation; the words themselves have no
ascertainable meaning either inherent or historical. Compare
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Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453-455 [59 S. Ct.
618, 83 L. Ed. 888]. The courses of action, listed under the
first offense, which an accused-including an employee.,.-may
not urge others to take, comprehends those· which in many
instances would normally result from merely publicizing,
without annoyance or threat of any kind, the facts of a labor
dispute. An intention to hinder, delay or interfere with a
lawful business, which is an element of the second offense,
likewise can be proved merely by showing that others reacted
in a way normally expectable of some upon learning the facts
of a dispute. The vague contours of the term 'picket' are
nowhere delineated. Employees or others, accordingly, may
be found to be within the purview of the term and convicted
for engaging in activities identical with those proscribed by
the first offense. In sum, whatever the means used to publicize the facts of a labor dispute, whether by printed sign,
by pamphlet, by word of mouth or otherwise, all such activity
without exception is within the inclusive prohibition of the
statute so long as it OCcurs in the vicinity of the scene of the
dispute." (Italics added.)
Likewise,· in the case of Oarlson v. Oalifornia, supra, the
Supreme Court of the United States in striking down as unconstitutional and void an ordinance of Shasta County, California, similar to the ordinance here under consideration because of its" sweeping and inexact terms," made this very
pertinent declaration:
"The sweeping and inexact terms of the ordinance disclose
the threat to freedom of speech inherent in its existence. It
cannot be thought to differ in any material respect from the
statute held void in Thornhill's case. The carrying of signs
and banners, no less than the raising of a flag, is a natural
and appropriate means of conveying information on matters
of public concern. (Stromberg v. Oalifornia, 283 U. S. 359
[51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117, 73 A. L. R. 1484].) For
the reasons set forth in our opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama,
supra, publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful
way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by
word of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within
that liberty of communication which is secured to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a
state. "
In reviewing the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States in connection with my study of the case at bar
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and the preparation of this opinion, I have been strongly
impressed with the decided liberal trend of the decisions of
that great court, which in its pronouncements in the field of
those fundamental and basic personal rights and liberties referred to as civil liberties, have exemplified profound vision
and foresight and eminent fairness in extending the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and of tne press
not only the strong, the wealthy and the powerful, but like- .
wise the weak, the humble and the oppressed. It is these
pronouncements which will protect a defenseless minority
from being legislated against and their freedom of expression
curtailed by those who happen to be in the majority or who
control the legislative processes for the time being. Such a
situation was depicted by Mr. Justice Murphy in speaking
for the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, when he said:
"A like threat is inherent in a penal statute, like that in
question here, which does not aim specifically at evils within
the allowable area of State control but, on the contrary,
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or
of the press. The existence of stwh a statute, which readily
lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local
prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to
merit their displeasure, res1,(,lts in a continuous and pervasive
restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably
be regarded as within its pttrview. It is not any less effective
or, if the restraint is not permissible, less pernicious than the
restraint on freedom of discussion imposed by the threat of
censorship. An accused, after arrest and conviction under
such a statute, does not have to sustain the burden of demonstrating that the State could not constitutionally have written
a different and specific statute covering his activities as disclosed by the charge and the evidence introduced against him.
(Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 155, 162, 163 [60 S. Ct.
146, 84 L. Ed. 155].) Where regulations of the liberty of
free discussion are concerned, there are special reasons for
observing the rule that it is the statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of
permissible conduct and warns against transgression. (Stromberg v. Oa.lifornia, 283 U. S. 359, 368 [51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L.
Ed. 1117, 73 A. L. R. 1484]; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S.
147, 155, 162, 163 [60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155].) Compare
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Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 [59 S. Ct. 618, 83
L. Ed. 888]." (Emphasis added.)
So zealously has the Supreme Court of the United States
guarded and protected these fundamental personal rights and
liberties that in the case of Schneider v. State, supra, that
court struck down as unconstitutional and void four ordinances enacted respectively by the cities of Los Angeles,
California, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Worcester, Massachusetts,
and Irvington, New Jersey, designed to prohibit the distribution of handbills, leaflets, circulars, etc., in said cities. Mr.
Justice Roberts, speaking for the court in said case, .declared:
"It is argued that the circumstance that in the actual enforcement of the Milwaukee ordinance the distributor is
arrested only if those who receive the literature throw it in
the streets, renders it valid. But, even as thus construed, the
ordinance cannot be enforced without unconstitutionally
abridging the liberty of free speech. As we have pointed out,
the public convenience in respect of clea:r;tliness of the streets
does not justify an exertion of the police power which invades the free communication of information and opinion
secured by the Constitution.
"It is suggested that the Los Angeles and Worcester ordinances are valid because their operation is limited to streets
and alleys and leaves persons free to distribute printed matter in other public places. But, as we have said, the streets
are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of
his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on
the plea that it maybe exercised in some other place.
, 'The freedom of speech and o.f the press secured by the
First Amendment against abridgment by the United States
is similarly secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a state.
"Although a municipality may enact regulations in the
interest of the public safety, health, welfare or convenience,
these may not abridge the individual liberties secured by the
Constitution to those who wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or opinion. . ..
, 'This court has characterized the freedom of speech and
that of the press as fundamental personal rights ,and liberties.
The phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly used.
It reflects the belief of the framers ()~ the Constitution that
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exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men. It stresses, as do many opinions of this
court, the importance of preventing the restriction of enjoyment of these liberties.
"In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of
the rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine
the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task
falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support
of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights."
The chief contention of the prosecuting officers in the case
at bar is that the ordinance here in question may be upheld
as a valid exercise of police power . While the realm within
which the police power operates may be somewhat indefinite,
it may not be invoked to abridge the fundamental right of
freedom of expression guaranteed by constitutional mandate.
The Constitution is the b.ulwark or our civil liberty and it
should be so construed as to protect that liberty against
encroachment even under the guise of the police power. While
some of its provisions have at times been emasculated by
enthusiastic advocates of the police power doctrine, the Constitution still remains the fundamental law of the land and
will continue to be such so long as the ideal of civil liberty is
predominate in the hearts and minds of the American people.
In my opinion, the ordinance here in question trenches upon
the right of free expression guaranteed by both our state and
federal Constitutions, and should therefore be stricken down.
If "picketing" means "the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute," then the right to picket,
as well as the right to preach, lecture, teach, or publish a
newspaper,all fall in the same category. If the Constitution
protects one of these rights, it protects the others. If a crime
is committed by a person while exercising one or more of these
rights, he may be prosecuted, convicted and punished for the
crime, not for the exercise of the right to picket, preach,
lecture, teach, or publish a newspaper. In my opinion, any
legislative enactment designed to abridge or limit any of the
above-mentioned rights flies squarely in the face of the con.
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stitutional guarantee of· freedom of speech and press, and
should be declared null and void by the courts under their
constitutional power.
From what I have said in the foregoing opinion, it is obvious
that section 3 as well as section 2 of the ordinance here under
consideration is void, and there can be no doubt but that
habeas corpus is the only remedy available to petitioners to
test the validity of said ordinance. (See cases collected and
commented on in 13 Cal. Jur. p. 225, sec. 8.)
In view of my determination that the ordinance is invalid
and void because the language employed therein is too vague,
uncertain and indefinite to provide a sufficiently ascertainable
standard of guilt and that the acts denounced by it cannot be
proscribed because they are not within the· purview of the
police power of the state, the complaint therefore fails to
charge a public offense, and it is unnecessary to review the
evidence presen"ted during the trial in the justice's court.
The majority opinions in this case are predicated upon the
theory that since section 3 of the ordinance in question purports to prohibit "picketing by means of acts of violence"
(whatever this phrase means), it defines a crime within the
purview of the police power of the county of Yuba, and notwithstanding the defendants were found guilty of violating
all of the provisions of both sections 2 and 3 of the ordinance
(a portion of the charge being based on Obviously invalid
provisions of the ordinance), the judgment against them is
nevertheless immune from attack on habeas corpus.
I am of the opinion, that even if it can be said that section 3
of the ordinance sufficiently defines a crime as held by a
majority of the court, the conviction of the defendants should
not be allowed to stand for the reason that the complaint
which forms the basis of the prosecution is wholly insufficient
to charge a public offense, and the judgment against petitioners is void for the reason that they were found guilty of
the commission of lawful as well as unlawful acts.
Section 3 of the ordinance in question makes unlawful,
"picketing by means· of compUlsion, coercion, intimidation,
threats, acts of violence, or fear." All of these means, except
"acts of violence" may be resorted to by those who are peacefully and therefore lawfully engaged in publicizing a labor
dispute by means of picketing or boycotting.
That there is such a thing as moral compulsion, coercion,
intimidation, threats, and fear is a proposition recognized in
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experience and by many court decisions, and in my opinion,
these words do not necessarily imply conduct of an unlawful
character when applied to a labor dispute. Such words may
be used to define the usual, ordinary and customary moral,
social and economic pressure which inheres in every labor
dispute and particularly where picketing is resorted to.
It must be conceded that it is within the constitutional right
of a person engaged in a labor dispute to advise those who
contemplate crossing a picket line, that if they do so, future
social or business relations with them will be withheld. It
must also be conceded that such advice constitutes a threat,
and it also amounts to compulsion, intimidation and coercion.
Such compulSIon, intimidation and coercion is the result of
fear of the· withholding of such social or business relations
which may have been both pleasant and profitable to the
person who is threatened with the loss thereof. Obviously,
conduct constituting such threats, compulsion, intimidation,
coercion or fear cannot be proscribed by penal statute or ordinance for the reason that the same would constitute a violation
of the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition,
defines "compulsion" as follows:
, '1. Act of compelling, or state of being compelled; act of
driving or urging by force or by physical or moral constraint;
SUbjection to force. Cf. Coercion.
"I would give no man a reason upon compulsion."
"2. Anything that compels; as, to live under compulsion."
The same work defines" coercion" as follows:
"1. The act, process, or power of coercing; specif., the application to another of such force, either physical or moral, as
to constrain him to do against his will something he would not
otherwise have done; compulsion. Coercion may cause the act
produced to bea nullity so far as concerns legal ability.
Cf. Duress.
"2. The application of legal or governmental measures to a
group or nation, so as to bring its outward conformity."
And "intimidation" is defined by the same work as follows:
, 'To make timid or fearful; to inspire or affect with fear;
to make fearful; to frighten; specif., to deter, as by threats;
to overawe; cow.
"Now guilt, once harbored in a conscious breast,
"Intimidates the brave, degrades the great.
Johnson.
"Syn.-Terrify, daunt, deter, abash. See Frighten.
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"Ant.-Embolden, hearten, inspirit. See Encourage.
" Act of making timid or fearful or of deterring by threats;
state of being intimidated, as the voters were kept from the
polls by intimidation."
It will be observed from the foregoing definitions that the
mere assertion that compulsion, coercion or intimidation has
been used or resorted to for the accomplishment of an object
or purpose or in the performance of an act, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that the means employed was unlawful,
immoral or unjust. In fact, it is inconceivable that a labor
dispute could result in a strike, and that striking employees
and their sympathizers could picket and boycott places of
business, without the owners, employees or patrons of such
places of business being subjected to some degree of moral,
social or economic compulsion, coercion or intimidation. It
appears to be settled beyond any question by the authorities
which I have cited above, and by many other authorities both
in this and other jurisdictions, that the moral, social and
economic compulsion, coercion and intimidation which may be
occasioned as the result of peaceful picketing, boycotting and
publicizing of labor disputes, cannot be proscribed by statute
or prohibited by injunction because 'Such conduct is permissible as a lawful exercise of the constitutional right of free
speech, free press and free assemblage.
What is said with reference to the meaning of the words
"compulsion," "coercion" and" intimidation" when applied
to peaceful picketing and boycotting, is equally true with
reference to the word "threat." It cannot be denied that a
person has the right to threaten that which he has a lawful
right to do, and that such threat cannot be proscribed by
statute or ordinance, or prohibited by injunction. The late
Mr. Justice Holmes, while a member of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in the case of V egelahn v. Gunther,
167 IVlass. 92 [44 N. E. 1077, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443, 35 L. R. A.
722], made this observation in one of his history-making dis~
senting opinions. He said:
"I pause here to remark that the word 'threats' often is
used as if, when it appeared that threats had been made, it
appeared that unlawful conduct had begun. But it depends
on what you threaten. As a general rule, even if subject to
some exceptions, what you may do in a certain event you may
threaten to do-that is. give warning of your intention to do-
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in that event, and thus allow the other person the chance of
avoiding the consequence. So as to 'compulsion,' it depends
on how you 'compel' ... So as to 'annoyance' or 'intimidation.' ."
In the case of Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, 2 Cal. (2d) 312
[41 Pac. (2d) 314], at page 318, this court quoted with
approval from its decision in the case of Pierce v. Stablemen's
Union, 156 Cal. 70 [103 Pac. 324], as follows:
" 'The right of united labor to strike, in furtherance of
trade interests (no contractual obligation standing in the way)
is fully recognized. The reason for the strike may be based
upon the refusal to comply with the employees' demand for
the betterment of wages, conditions, hours of labor, in the
discharge of one employee, or the engagement of another-in
brief, in anyone or more of the multifarious considerations
which in good faith may be believed to tend toward the advancement of the employees. After striking, the employees
may engage in a boycott, as that word is here employed. As
here employed it means not only the right to the concerted
withdrawal of social and business intercourse, but the right
by all legitimate means-of fair publication, and fair oral or
written persuasion, to induce others interested in or sympathetic with their cause, to withdraw their social intercourse
and business patronage from the employer. They may go even
further than this, and request of another that he withdraw his
patronage from the employer, and may 1lse the moral intimidation and coercion of threatening a like boycott aga1:nst .him
if he ref'i,lse so to do. This last proposition necessarily involves
the bringing into a labor dispute between A and B, C, who
has no difference with either. It contemplates that C, upon
the request of B, and under the moral intimidation lest B
boycott him, may thus be constrained to withdraw his patronage from A, with whom he has no controversy." (Emphasis
added.)
In the case of Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Oouncil,
154 Cal. 581,610 [98 Pac. 1027, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165,21 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 550], Mr. Justice Sloss in his concurring opinion
quoted with approval from the dissenting opinion of the late
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Vegelahn v. Gunther, s'/,{,pra,
as follows:
" 'If it be true that workingmen may combine with a view,
among other things, to getting as much as they can for their
labor, just as capital may combine with a view to getting the

greatest possible return, it must be true that when combined
they have the same liberty that combined capital has to support their interests by argument, persuasion, and the bestowal
or refusal of those advantages which they otherwise lawfully
control. '
"The terms' intimidation' and' coercion, ' so frequently used
in the discussion of this question,seem to me to have no application to such acts as were here committed. One cannot be
said to be 'intimidated' or 'coerced,' in the sense of unlawful
compUlsion, by being induced to forego business relations with
A, rather than lose the benefit of more profitable relations
with B. It is equally beside the question to speak of 'threats,'
where that which is threatened is only what the party has a
legal right to do."
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the case of Local Union
No. 26 etc. v. City of Kokomo, 211 Ind.. 72 [5 N. E. (2d) 624,
at page 628, 108 A. L. R. 1111], discusses the meaning of the
words "compulsion" and "coercion" in relation to a labor
dispute in the. following language:
, 'The city ordinance now before the court makes all picketing of the employer's premises, or the approach thereto, unlawful. No force or violence is necessary to make the act of
picketing unlawful and punishable. Peaceable acts upon the
part of the employees are authorized expressly by chapter 12
of the Acts of 1933. The allegations of the complaint show
no acts involving fraud or violence. The 1933 act authorizes
the doing of all acts alleged in the complaint, which alleges
that such acts were performed by lawful means and without
fraud or violence, or any intention or purpose to injure the
employer. The act of striking or picketing necessarily involves compulsion and coercion, and unless the same is performed by acts of fraud or violence, is lawful and permissible
under .the statute.
"The act of picketing is a means of 'compulsion and coercion,' but if it is exercised in a legal manner, and without
fraud or violence, it is lawful under the statute, yet it is the
clear intention of the ordinance to prevent such acts. The
overt act of assembling and congregating for concerted action
in a peaceable, lawful manner is made punishable by the ordi.
nance. The ordinance is repugnant to the declared purpose
and object of the statute."
I think the foregoing authorities clearly hold that to some
extent moral, social and economic compulsion, coercion and
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intimidation inheres in every labor dispute where picketing
Rnd boycotting is resorted to by striking employees and their
sympathizers, and that such compulsion, coercion and intimidation, so long as it is exercised without fraud, force or violence, does not transcend the realm of peaceful picketing, and
cannot be proscribed by statute or ordinance. This conclusion is sustained by the trend of recent decisions, particularly
those of the Supreme Court of the United States, which I
have cited herein. The clear purport of these decisions is' to
the effect that any statute or ordinance which proscribes or
prohibits peaceful picketing is in clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Of course, it is elementary that a person engaged in picketing is amenable to all of our penal statutes denouncing as
crimes all acts of force, violence, menacing threats, riots,
routs, disturbing of the peace, unlawful assembly, assault
and battery, etc., and my attention has not been called to any
acts which one engaged in picketing might perpetrate in violation of the civil rights of another, or inimical to public
peace and safety, which are not now denounced as crimes by
the penal statutes of this state and punishable as such.
The complaint against petitioners follows the language of
the ordinance and the petitioners were charged as follows:
"That on or about the 9th day of July, 1939, and within
the limits of the County of Yuba, in the State of California,
said defendants did then and there wilfully and unlawfully
beset and/or picket the premises and/or the approach thereto
of another, to-wit, the Earl Fruit Company located approximately seven miles southwest of the City of Marysville, in
the County of Yuba, State of Oalifornia, and commonly
known as the New England Ranch where persons were employed and/or sought employment, for the purpose of inducing such employees and/or persons seeking employment by
means of compulsion, and/or coercion and/or intimidation
and/or threats and/or acts of violence and/or to quit his or
her employment and/or to refrain from seeking or freely entering into said employment."
It appears to be well settled that where a' statute is so
framed that lawful as well as unlawful acts may be punished
under it, a complaint charging a violation of the law must
specifically set out the alleged unlawful conduct of the
accused, and negative lawful conduct on his part. Otherwise,
a complaint under such a law fails to charge a public offense,

which is the situation we have in the case at bar. (Ex parte
Peterson, 119 Cal. 578 [51 Pac. 859] ; Ex parte McLaughlin,
16 Cal. App. 270 [116 Pac. 684] ; In re Hernandez, 64 Cal.
App. 71 [220 Pac. 423].)
Tested by the rule announced in the foregoing authorities,
the complaint in the case at bar was clearly insufficient to
charge the petitioners with the commission of a public offense.
As I have heretofore pointed out, the ordinance is clearly
invalid in so far as it purports to denounce as a public offense
picketing by meaIis of compulsion, coercion, or intimidation
as such words are defined in the authorities relating to picketing cases. Such being the case, the complaint against petitioners charges them with the doing of lawful as well as
unlawful acts, and is therefore insufficient to charge a public
offense and is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction
against petitioners for a violation of section 3 of said ordinance.
Furthermore, the complaint in the case at bar charges both
in the conjunctive and disjunctive the violation of every act
denounced by section 3 of the ordinance. This method of
pleading is clearly improper. It is impossible to d~termine
from such a complaint what ~pecific acts or conduct of the
defendants the prosecution intends to prove for the purpose
of establishing their guilt. Under the complaint in this case,
the defendants could have. been found guilty of a violation of
section 3 of said ordinance if they did nothing more than
stand on the side of the road peacefully holding. a piece of
cardboard in their hands containing a statement that a labor
dispute was in progress on the adjacent premises. Such a
complaint is clearly insufficient to charge a public offense, and
may be tested on habeas corpus. (Ex parte Greenall, 153 Cal.
767 [96 Pac. 804]; In re A.h Sing; 156 Cal. 349 [104 Pac.
448] .)
- The trial court made no attempt to segregate the charges in
the complaint charging an alleged unlawful offense from those
charging the commission of purely lawful acts. This is demonstrated not only by the allegations of the petition, but also
by those of the return. Both allege that the jury found the
defendants guilty "as charged in the complaint," and that
the sentence imposed was imposed "on said conviction." I
think it is clear that such a complaint could not authorize the
trial court to try the accused for acts which are lawful, nor

532

IN

RE BELL.

[19 C. (2d)

could it confer jurisdiction on the trial court to convict the
accused for the doing of lawful acts, and to sentence them for
the doing of such lawful acts. That is exactly what was done
in the instant case. The defendants were found guilty "as
charged in the complaint" and sentence was imposed" on said
conviction. " That means that the jury found that the defendants were guilty of all the" offenses" charged in the complaint, including those predicated upon those portions of the
statute which are admittedly unconstitutional. It also means
that the sentence was partially predicated on the unconstitutional portions of the statute. It certainly needs no citation
of authority to establish the proposition that a trial court has
no jurisdiction to enter a judgment convicting an accused of
acts which are lawful. Petitioners have exhausted the only
other remedy available to them, namely, an appeal. On that
appeal the constitutionality of the statute was in issue, and
the court to which the appeal was taken had jurisdiction to
reverse the judgment of conviction and retry the case upon
issues raised by a plea of not guilty of the unlawful act
charged. Since this is so, habeas corpus is now the only
remedy available to petitioners.
On a habeas corpus proceeding the only question involved
is one of jurisdiction, namely, did the court below have the
lawful authority to make or issue the particular order, judgment or process under attack. (See the many cases from the
United States Supreme Court, California Supreme Court and
other state courts collected and commented on in 22 Am. Jur.
159, sec. 26; 13 Cal. Jur. 222, sec. 7.) All courts are agreed
on this point. .While there is some confusion in the cases as
to the meaning of the term" jurisdiction," as used in habeas
corpus proceedings, the overwhelming weight of authority is
to the effect that the term includes more than the question as
to whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the person and
subject matter. It is now settled that jurisdiction over the
person and subject matter is not alone conclusive, but that the
jurisdiction of the court to make or render the order or judgment that serves as the basis of the imprisonment is a proper
subject of inquiry. Stated another way, jurisdiction to render
the particular order or judgment in question is deemed as
essential as is jurisdiction of the person or subject matter.
(See cases collected and commented on in 22 Am. Jur. 161,
sec. 27; 76 A. L.R. 469.)
Moreover, it must be remembered that petitioners were con-
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victed in an inferior court and not by a superior court. As to
such courts, no presumption will be indulged as to the regularity of the proceedings therein. ' It has been consistently
held that, as to justice's courts, nothing will be presumed in
favor of their jurisdiction. (Antilla v. Justice's Oourt, 209
Cal. 621 [290 Pac. 43], and numerous other authorities cited
in the foot note to 6 Cal. Jur. 10 Yr. Supp. 611, sec. 85.)
Even if it be conceded,. as erroneously held in the maj ority
opinions, that there is a presumption of regularity of the
proceedings in a justice's court, there is no basis for the application of such a rule here, for the reason that it affirmativetY
and conclusively appears on the face of the record itself that
petitioners were charged, convicted and sentenced for the commission of acts which both this court and the Supreme Court
of the United States have held to be beyond the power of the
state or its political subdivisions to proscribe.
Tested by these standards, and, keeping in mind the fact
that the convictions were here had in an inferior court, the
judgment of conviction is subject to collateral attack on habeas
corpus. The trial court, although it may have had jurisdiction
of the person and subject matter, had no jurisdiction to convict and sentence the petitioners for offenses based wholly or
in part 0n an unconstitutional statute. While it is true that
habeas corpus will not always issue where other remedies are
available, it is settled that habeas corpus properly may be used
to test the constitutionality of a statute (see cases collected
and cpmmented on in 13 Cal. Jur. 225, sec. 8), and that the
fact that a remedy by appeal may exist is not a complete bar
to the proceeding. Certainly, where, as in this case, the petitioners appeal and raise the question of the constitutionality
of the statute on such appeal, and, where the court to which
the appeal is taken has complete jurisdiction to pass on the
question, hut, nevertheless affirms the invalid judgment, habeas
corpus is available.
A writ of habeas corpus should therefore be granted and the
petitioners discharged from custody.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied March
12, 1942~ Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.

